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are represented in Nigeria, with the
major foreign stakeholder being Shell.
Nigeria produced an average of
2355.8 thousand barrels of crude oil
per day in 2007, 2.92per cent of the
world total and a change of -4.8per
cent compared to 2006.
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1.0

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria has a population of about
130million people and an abundance
of natural resources, especially
hydrocarbons. It is the 10th largest oil
producer in the world, the third largest
in Africa and has the most prolific oil
producer in the Sub-Saharan Africa.
The Nigerian economy is largely
dependent on its oil sector which
supplies 95per cent of its foreign
exchange earnings.
The upstream oil industry is Nigeria's
lifeblood and yet it is also central to the
civil unrest in the country, which
gained worldwide publicity with the
trial and execution of Ken Saro Wiwa,
and eight other political activists in
1995. The upstream oil industry is the
single most important sector in the
economy. According to the 2008 BP
Statistical Energy Survey, Nigeria had
proven oil reserves of 36.22billion
barrels at the end of 2007 or 2.92per
cent of the world's reserves. The
Nigerian government plans to expand
its proven reserves to 40 billion barrels
by 2010. Most of this is produced from
the prolific Niger River Delta. Despite
problems associated with ethnic
unrest, border disputes and
government funding, Nigeria's wealth
of oil makes it most attractive to the
major oil-multinationals, most of who

According to the 2008 BP Statistical
Energy Survey, Nigeria had in 2007
proven natural gas reserves of
5.29trillion cubic metres, 2.98per cent
of the world total. Due, mainly, to the
lack of gas infrastructure, 75per cent
of associated gas is flared and 12 per
cent re-injected. Nigeria has set a
target of zero flare by 2010 and is
providing incentives for the
production and use of gas. The
government also plans to raise
earnings from natural gas exports to
50 percent of oil revenues by 2010. It
has been reported in the 2008 BP
Statistical Energy Survey that Nigeria
had 2007 natural gas production of
34.97 billion cubic meters, 1.18 per
cent of the world total.
Nigeria's downstream oil industry is
also a key sector including four
refineries with a nameplate capacity
of 438,750 bb/d. Problems such as
fire, sabotage, poor management,
lack of turnaround maintenance and
corruption have meant that the
refineries often operate at 40per cent
of full capacity, if at all. This has
resulted in shortages of refined
product and the need to increase
imports to meet domestic demand.
Nigeria has a robust petrochemicals
industry based on its substantial
refining capacity and natural gas
resources. The petroLeum industry is
focused around the three centres of
Kaduna, Warri and Eleme.
Until 1960, government participation
in the industry was limited to the
regulation and administration of fiscal
policies. In 1971, Nigeria joined
OPEC and in line with OPEC
resolutions, the Nigerian National Oil
Corporation (NNOC) was
established, later becoming NNPC in

1977. This giant parastatal, with all its
subsidiary companies, controls and
dominates all sectors of the oil
i n d u s t r y, b o t h u p s t r e a m a n d
downstream. In April 2000, the
Nigerian government set up a new
committee on oil and gas reform to
deal with the deregulation and
privatization of NNPC. Seven
subsidiaries of NNPC were to be sold
including the three refineries, the
Eleme Petrochemicals Company Ltd,
the Nigerian Petroleum Development
Company and the partially owned oil
marketing firm, Hyson Nigeria Ltd.
Nigeria is a member of OPEC and is its
12th largest producer. The petroLeum
industry in Nigeria is regulated by the
Ministry of Petroleum Resources. The
government retains close control over
the industry and the activities of the
NNPC, whose senior executives are
appointed by the ruling government.
As in many other developing-world
federations with “twentieth-century
constitutions” and large regionally
concentrated hydrocarbons, multiethnic Nigeria has entrusted the
ownership, regulation and
redistribution of its oil and gas wealth
in the federal government (Watts: 98).
At the same time, the country's fiscal
federalism architecture
constitutionally and statutorily
guarantees the devolution of
considerable amounts of centrally
collected oil and gas revenues to the
federation's state and local
governments.
This paper is to discuss the oil and gas
management in Nigeria: Lessons for
Ghana. The paper is structured into
five parts with part 1 being the
introduction while part 2 scoops the
literature on the economics of natural
resources and its management
globally. Part 3 will situate the Nigeria's
multifaceted crisis of oil and gas
governance and all related issues.
Part 4 will sieve out the lessons for
Ghana while part 5 summarizes and
concludes the paper.

*The views expressed in the paper are those of the author and do not in any way represent the official position or thinking of the Central Bank of Nigeria. The author
acknowledges the comments and criticisms of anonymous reviewer.
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LITERATURE REVIEW ON
T H E E C O N O M I C
MANAGEMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES

Economists globally believe and they
are concerned that economies
dominated by natural resources
would somehow be disadvantaged in
the drive for economic progress
(Prebisch, 1950, 1964; Singer, 1950).
Baldwin (1996) based his concern
upon the deteriorating terms of trade
between the “centre” and the
“periphery” coupled with concern over
the limited economic linkages from
primary product exports to the rest of
the economy.
In the 1970's, it was driven by the
impact of the oil shocks on the oil
exporting countries (Neary and Van
Wijnberger 1986; Mabro, 1980). In the
1980's, the phenomena of “Dutch
Disease” (the impact of an overvalued
exchange rate on the non-resource
traded sector) attracted attention
(Corden, 1984). Finally in the 1990's,
it was the impact of revenues from oil,
gas and mineral projects on
government behavior that dominated
the discussion (Ascher, 1999; Auty,
1990; Steven, 1986)
The common thread running through
all these concerns are that the
development of natural resources
should generate revenues to translate
into economic growth and
development. Thus the revenues
accruing to the economies should
provide capital in the form of foreign
exchange overcoming what was seen
as a key barrier to economic progress.
The development theories, especially
the requirement for a “big-push”
(Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943 and 1961;
Murphy et al., 1989) capital constraint
(Lewis, 1955; Rostow, 1960) and
dual-gap analysis (Joshi, 1970;
Elshibley and Thirwal 1981)
supported these concerns.
However, the reality appeared to be
the reverse. Countries with abundant
natural resources appeared to
perform less well than their more
poorly endowed neighbors. Thus
“resource curse” began to enter the
literature (Auty 1993). These
concerns had caused the IMF/World
Bank to get involved with some nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to
work out the way forward in
encouraging a “resource blessing”

rather than “resource curse” by
creating the “Extractive Industry
Review” based in Jakarta to consider
whether the World Bank group
should, as a matter of principle have
any involvement with the project of
assessing the negative effects of oil,
gas and mineral projects on
developing countries.
Among financial investors in oil, gas
and mineral projects, there is growing
concern that the negative effects of
“resource curse” could actually
threaten the economies of the
projects. This could be because the
presence of “resource curses”
increases the political risk associated
with the project. Finally, this renewed
interest is being fuelled by the fact that
a number of countries are about to
receive large amounts of revenue
from such projects. Hence there is
real concern and policy deliberation
over how these revenues might be
used as a positive rather than a
negative force. These countries
include some of the newly
independent states of the former
Soviet Union such as Azerbarjan and
Kazakhstan, a number of African
countries such as Angola, Chad and
Ghana, the most recent; and some in
South East Asia such as West Papua
and East Timor.
However, in the literature, there are
references to countries that allegedly
managed to have “resource blessing”
and avoided the “resource cursed”.
For example, some states with large
extractive industries-like Botswana,
Chile and Malaysia have overcome
many of the obstacles
and
implemented sound pro-poor
strategies (Hope, 1998; Jiwanji,
2000). The literature is replete with the
analysis on “resource curse” but very
few analyses on the “resource
blessing” or “resource impact”.
Countries such as Botswana, Chile,
Indonesia and Malaysia are success
stories and the lessons of these
countries should be relevant for
Ghana to adopt in order to avoid the
Nigeria's pitfall and have success
story as well.
The literature uses a variety of criteria
to establish the impact of Oil, gas and
mineral projects. The economic
criteria approach is the best in doing
analysis for the economies with
diverse resources and large
56

population. The first is what happens
to the rest of the traded economy as
oil, gas and mineral projects involve
the depletion of an exhaustible
resource. One definition of
sustainability requires that when the
resources are depleted, other sectors
of the economy have the strength to
continue to generate value added.
The second is what happens to
people's well-being as the project
develops.
Much of recent literature (Auty, 2001;
Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997 and
1998) looks at what happened to
percapita GDP as a means to
determine economic performance.
This approach is potentially flawed as
GDP clearly include the value of the
oil, gas and minerals. There is a
tendency in the literature to use
periods that distort the results. For
example, one source bases the
argument about poor performance on
per capital GDP growth between
1955-97 (Auty, 2001). Yet in this
period, real oil prices fell from $42.70
to $20.04 (BP, 2000). Where oil is
significant in GDP, it is hardly
surprising that per capita GDP
registers a fall. Given the linkages
that exist between gas and oil prices,
a similar argument applies to gas. In
theory, GDP measured in real terms
should account for this but a cursory
look at real GDP pattern for oil
exporters illustrates it does not. Thus,
the key variable to consider is the
non-oil gas or mineral traded GDP
since it is this that must eventually
sustain the economy. Such a criterion
also makes sense in the context of
“Dutch Disease” when it is precisely
that traded sector which is expected
to suffer and contract. Consequently,
the literature seems flawed and what
should be the focus of measuring
import should be the “traded
economy criterion” (Steven P, 2003)
which is the real per capita growth of
agriculture, manufacturing and
services.
The second approach-“peoples' well
being” is more difficult to translate into
operational criterion. Obviously,
poverty levels and poverty reduction
are keys but poverty data are of very
mixed and generally poor quality.
However, the UNDP criteria could
come be useful, such as infant
mortality, life expectancy and
illiteracy, etc.
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NIGERIA'S OIL AND GAS
MANAGEMENT

Nigeria ranks among the top 10
nations in proven oil and natural gas
reserves, worldwide. The number of
international petroleum companies
operating in Nigeria has increased
from a single producer (Shell BP) in
1958 to more than 24 producers in
2007. The top four companies- Shell
Petroleum Development Company
(Shell), ExxonMobil, Chevron Nigeria
Limited (CNL) and Total (formerly Elf
Petroleum Nigeria Limited or EPNL) accounted for nearly 83 percent of
Nigeria's total petroleum production in
2008, an indication that the Nigeria
petroleum industry is dominated by
few international firms. The new
players to emerge in recent years
include the Korean national Oil
C o m p a n y, A d d a x P e t r o l e u m
Development (Nigeria) Limited, China
National Oil Company, Express
Petroleum, Cavendish, AENR,
Consolidated Oil Limited (Conoil), and
AMNI International (AMNI)
(Ariweokuma, 2008).
The changing structure of the industry
coupled with the dominated control of
the government fiscal revenue has a
strong influence on the management
of the oil and gas sector in Nigeria. Oil
royalties, Petroleum profit tax,
domestic crude sales, and others
Petroleum revenues were only 26 per
cent of federally collected revenues in
1970, but rose dramatically to 81 per
cent in 1980. They represented 73.3
per cent in 1990, 83.5 per cent in 2000
and an estimated 79per cent in 2007
(before the leap in prices in 2008). The
expansion of the Petroleum industry
from the seventies produced
fundamental changes in the structural
configuration and fiscal architecture of
the Nigerian Federation.
3.1

Ownership and Jurisdiction

In terms of ownership and jurisdiction,
the current 1999 Nigerian Constitution
as amended affirms the Federal
Government's proprietorship and
control of all minerals, mineral oils and
natural gas in, under or upon any land
in Nigeria, its territorial waters, and
exclusive economic zone. All such
minerals, oils and gas shall 'vest in the
Government of the Federation (GoF)
and shall be managed in such a
manner as may be prescribed by the
National Assembly.' Accordingly, the

Constitution places under the Federal
Government's list of exclusive
legislative powers all matters relevant
to the regulation and management of
the Petroleum industry. These include
export duties, incorporation and
regulation of corporate bodies, mines
and minerals (including oil fields, oil
mining, geological surveys and
natural gas) and taxation of incomes,
profits and capital gains.
Although ownership and control of all
onshore and offshore mineral
resources is constitutionally and
statutorily vested in the Nigerian
Federal Government, the federation
has historically included
arrangements for the compensation
of oil bearing units through the
payments of portions of centrally
collected mineral revenues to those
units on a derivation or unit-of-origin
basis. However, whereas the
constitutional framework of the First
Republic had explicitly made both
onshore and offshore Petroleum
resources subject to the derivation
rule, a 1970 military decree limited the
application of the derivation principle
to revenues from onshore resources
only, while the post military
constitutions since 1979 (including
the current 1999 Constitution as
amended) have been silent on the
issue. In response to demands by the
Niger Delta states for the application
of the derivation rule to offshore oil
and gas revenues, the federal
government in 2001 approached the
Supreme Court for a determination of
the issue. In its ruling in April 2002, the
Court validated the Federal
Government's position that the
derivation principle should apply to
onshore resources only because
natural resources in Nigeria's
continental shelf belong to the
federation as a whole and, therefore,
cannot be said to be derivable from
the adjoining littoral states for revenue
allocation purposes. However,
following strident agitation in the Niger
Delta against the Court's ruling, the
federal government crafted a political
deal that culminated in the enactment
by the National Assembly of the
“Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of
Dichotomy in the Application of the
Principle of Derivation) Act of 2004”
This provided that an area of “two
hundred meter water depth isobaths
contiguous” to the littoral states would
deemed to belong to those states for
57

the purpose of the derivation principle.
This Act, however, provoked another
round of litigation and till date the
ownership and jurisdiction still belong
to the federal which has led to conflicts
and the exaggerated position of the
Niger Delta crisis up to 2009 (Suberu,
2008).
3.2

Exploration and Production
Regime

The Federal Government's absolute
powers over the Petroleum industry
have been exercised primarily through
four government institutions, namely,
the Presidency (the president and his
top advisors), the Ministry of
Petroleum (sometimes called the
Ministry of Energy, Mines and/or
Power), the Department of Petroleum
Resources (DPR), and the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC). The President, who has often
served as his own Minister of
Petroleum (usually supported by a
junior-level Minister of State for
Petroleum), and his senior advisors on
Petroleum matters, along with the top
leadership of the NNPC, “form the
inner circle for oil sector decisionmaking” (Gilles 2009).
The DPR functions as the official
i n d u s t r y r e g u l a t o r, w i t h t h e
responsibility to oversee or supervise
the activities of all companies licensed
to operate in the industry, including the
NNPC. It is charged with processing
all applications for licenses and leases
in the industry, ensuring compliance of
all industry operators with applicable
national regulations and good oil
producing practices, enforcing safety
and environmental standards,
keeping and updating records on
Petroleum industry operations,
ensuring timely and adequate
payments of all rents and royalties to
the government, promoting and
monitoring progress towards the
indigenization of (or the enhancement
of 'local content' in) the oil industry,
and providing appropriate technical
advice on oil industry matters to the
government. Reflecting the
disorganization that often
characterizes the Nigeria Petroleum
industry, the DPR existed as a unit
within the NNPC until 1988, “creating
the untenable situation of the regulator
being subordinate to the industry's
largest player (Gilles, 2009).
The NNPC is the commercial and
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business agency of the federal
government in the Petroleum sector,
with the most important oil and gas
projects in the industry typically
involving joint venture arrangements,
production sharing contracts and
related commercial partnerships
between the NNPC and one or more
oil multinational companies. NNPC is
involved in two broad types of
exploration and production
arrangements with the oil
multinationals. First, the
concessionary arrangements, either
a Joint Venture Agreement or a
Memorandum of Understanding, are
governed basically by royalty and
taxation plus a government (NNPC)
majority participation interest. The
rewards to the federation in terms of
revenues are based on posted price
and gross oil and gas production in
the form of bonuses, royalty
payments, taxation of profit, and
equity interest participation. A major
problem with the joint venture
structure has been the repeated
failures of NNPC to find its share of
capital and operating expenses.
Consequently, the second contractual
fiscal agreement, including
Production Sharing Contracts (PSC)
and Service Contracts (SC) was
invoked. Under the PSC, the
international oil company provides the
funding for exploration and
development operations in offshore
Nigeria with the profit shared
according to agreed arrangements
subsequent to the recovery permitted
company costs, subject to the
specified cost recovery limit. The first
production- sharing contract was
signed in1973 with Ashland Oil. The
contractual terms and instruments
included a 40percent cost oil recovery
limit, a 55 percent Petroleum profit
tax, and 70/30- profit oil split in favour
of the government.
Recent audits of the Petroleum
industry, under the auspices of the
Nigerian Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (NEITI), have
reinforced longstanding concerns and
criticisms regarding the capacity of
the federal political executive, the
Department of Petroleum resources
and the NNPC to effectively execute
their administrative and management
functions within the Petroleum
industry. These structures have
highlighted major shortcomings in the
governance of the industry, including

weak “DPR capacity, NNPC intrusion
into regulatory and policy-making
functions, lack of NNPC oversight and
accountability, and weak incentives
for efficiency and performance (Gilles,
2009). The Petroleum Industry Bill is
designed to address these
institutional inefficiencies.
The Petroleum Bill proposes three
new sets of oversight institutions for
the oil and gas sector in Nigeria. First,
the Bill establishes the Nigerian
Petroleum Directorate (NPD) as the
overarching and coordinating
Petroleum policy-making institution in
place of the Ministry of Petroleum
resources. Second, three regulatory
institutions, the Nigerian Petroleum
Inspectorate (NPI), the National
Midstream Regulatory Agency
(NAMIRA), and the Petroleum
Products Regulatory Authority
(PPRA) are proposed to regulate all
matters related to the upstream,
midstream and the downstream
sectors, respectively. The third
institution envisioned in the Bill is a
restructured, commercially focused
new national oil company. The goal is
to reposition the NNPC on a level
comparable to the status of
successful National Oil Corporations
(NOCs) in Malaysia, Venezuela,
Norway, Algeria, Mexico, Brazil and
Saudi Arabia. The relative absence of
operational and strategic autonomy of
the NNPC from the national
government in comparison to
successful NOCs elsewhere is
appalling. Separating regulatory
functions from commercial operations
should help to reduce the prevailing
ambiguities in regulatory
responsibilities that have beclouded
oil and gas operations in Nigeria over
the years.
3.3

Macroeconomic challenges

Petroleum has transformed Nigeria
from the diversified, agro-based
economy that it was up till the sixties
to the mono-resource; petroleum
based economy that it has become
since the 1970s. While Nigeria has
earned billions of dollars exporting oil
and natural gas, the industry has not
generated the type of multiplier effects
necessary to facilitate sustainable
national development and economic
growth. The “Dutch Disease”
phenomenon, which traditionally
afflicts natural resource dominated
economies, has ravaged the Nigerian
58

political economy. What is more, the
petroleum economy has made the
federation more like a unitary state
than a federation in a fiscal sense.
Expanded access to oil revenues has
increased the financial dependency
of the constituent states and localities
(which derive 90per cent of their
finances from federal revenue
transfers), accentuated the
disparities in central revenue transfer
to them, and led to an
underdevelopment both of alternative
sources of sub-national revenues
(partly because the fiscal effort
criterion in the allocation formula is
not worth much) and of effective
budget formulation, accounting,
recording, and reporting systems
(owing to the easy availability of
shared revenues). As things stand,
the poor quality of public financial
management at the sub-national
level, where approximately half of
national public spending takes place,
represents a huge macro-economic
challenge in Nigeria (IMF, 2009).
The oil legacy has also imposed
significant costs on the Nigerian
economy through petroleum and
energy price distortions, corruption
and inefficiencies, and fiscal
instability due mostly to crude oil price
volatility (Adenikinju, 2009). The
subsidization of domestic petroleum
prices has become a huge cost to the
national economy especially with
rising share of imports in domestic
petroleum product supply. The
subsidy has remained one of the most
convoluted and protracted socioeconomic policy issues and
macroeconomic challenges facing
Nigeria, defying attempts at its
resolution by successive
governments. The Petroleum subsidy
increased from N278.9billion in 2006
to N633.2 billion in 2008.
Since 2004, the Federal government
has spearheaded a political
agreement between all tiers of
government to implement an oil-price
based fiscal rule. In response to
significant fiscal instability, the rule
adopted an approach that is based on
relative conservative estimates of the
oil price for each budget with “excess
revenue” being saved for
stabilization. The oil price rule “broke
the link between public spending and
oil prices and created an oil-savings
cushion (the Excess Crude Account)
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of $18billion… as well as foreign
reserves that peaked in September
2008 at $62 billion” (IMF, 2009). This is
after government had used oil-saving
to pay out Nigeria's international debt
and negotiate debt forgiveness in
2006. The benefits of this rule became
evident with the sudden decline in
global crude oil prices from a high of
$147 in July 2008 to about $45 in
December 2008; the federal
government had based its budget on
an oil price of $45 and was able to
draw monies from the excess crude
fund to stabilize spending during
downturn.
A country that wants its future
generations to benefit from an
exhaustible resource such as
petroleum, must transform this nonrenewable resource into a renewable
one by investing in productive capital
in the form of machines, energy and
transportation infrastructure, water
resources and sanitation, and human
capital formation and development. Of
course appropriate institutions must
collect the revenue stream in order to
build the national wealth in a
transparent manner. Thus, one of the
key macro-economic strategies for
sustainable growth in a monoresource economy is effective
management of revenue flow during
times of rising resource prices and the
use of resource revenue to develop
lasting infrastructure to support the
economy. The success stories of
Chile, Malaysia, Botswana, and
Indonesia in the late 1990s came from
such effective management and
control of mineral revenue flows as
revenue increased with resources
prices (Stevens 2003).
Nigeria seems to be pursuing fiscal
discipline at the federal level, but such
discipline is yet to hold firm at the state
and local government levels, where
the worst corruption probably now
occurs. The Federal Government has
incorporated the oil-price fiscal rule
into the Fiscal responsibility Act of
2007, which seeks to institutionalize
budgetary transparency and
accountability, promote effective
management of the public sector, and
reduce leakages in the economy
(CBN, 2008). But reflecting pressures
by the state governors, the National
Assembly agreed to make the Act
inapplicable to the states on
constitutional autonomy ground. Yet,

the expected voluntary
implementation of fiscal responsibility
regimes by the sub-units is
progressing only slowly. The current
stabilization regime also does not
seem to have a truly integrated
structure in terms of federal, state and
local spending; the states seem to
have taken a bigger hit during the
downturn than did the federal
government.
3.4

Environmental and Social
Issues

Nigeria's centralized petroleum
industry governance framework
leaves the oil-bearing communities
with no constitutional or statutory
rights, voice, or even consent on oil
and gas industry projects in their
communities. This centralization
extends to decisions regarding the
use of land for the oil industry, which
“are completely taken out of the hands
of those who have lived on and used it
for centuries” (Human Rights Watch
199:71). Such total exclusion of the
Niger Delta communities from
participation in oil and gas decision
has combined with the environmental,
socio-economic, and political
deprivation of the region, to animate
the militant campaign for regional and
local “resource control ” in Delta.
On the environmental degradation,
there are numerous reports on the
impact of the Nigerian gas and oil
industry severe damage on the
environment and the livelihood of
many of those inhabiting the oil
producing communities (Amnesty
International 2009). Nigeria recorded
the highest gas flaring rates in the
world, the oil spillage or leakages
arising from non-replacement of
corroded, high pressure oil pipelinesvandalized /saboteur effected
pipelines have tremendously affected
the environment. With these
developments the Petroleum industry
operators are statutorily required to
observe highest international
environmental safety standards in
their activities but these are lacking
because all the rules binding the
operations are loosely enforced
owing to massive corruption of
governments at the three tiers of the
Government. This development had
made inactive all the productive
resources such as the fishing and
farming. This has increased the levels
of poverty unemployment and created
59

socio-economic inequalities in the
area.
In the reflection of these inequalities,
there had emerged profound
discontentment and what had
emanated is the intensive agitation
which has led to the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND)- an umbrella for a group of
militants in the region. These groups
held the production of the oil
companies to ransom in the last 3
years and thus affected the revenue of
the Federal government from oil. The
recent rehabilitation of the militants
had brought some level of respite to
the oil producing area of the Niger
Delta.
On the transparency and
accountability, the major source of
corruption in the oil industry include
the systematic favoritism and endemic
non-transparency perpetuated by the
federal executive and its agencies in
the allocation of licenses for the
exploration, prospecting and mining of
oil; large scale bribery of government
officials for approvals of major oil
sector contracts; the bureaucracy and
inefficiency of the government
officials; the direct bunkering or theft
(with apparent official complicity) of
crude oil from pipelines, flow stations,
and export facilities; and massive
irregularities and abuses in the
operations of the NNPC, its
subsidiaries, and associated bodies
l i k e P e t r o l e u m Te c h n o l o g y
Development Fund (PTDF) and the
NDDC.
Although there are no systematic data
on corruption in Nigeria, it was
acknowledged that the return of
civilian rule and the implementation of
macro-economic reforms by the
Obasanjo administration has arguably
reduced the scale of corruption at the
federal level, but not at the subnational level, where the end of
centralized military rule has
apparently increased, rather than
reduced, the opportunity for
gubernatorial misconduct.
4.0

LESSONS FOR GHANA

The governance status in Ghana is
quite consolidated that the discovery
of oil will not have any impact to distort
the good governance. In addition, it is
gratifying that Ghana was not under
the military rule as at the time of
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commercialization of the oil. In order
that Ghana makes the oil resource a
“blessing“ and not a “curse” the
following issues must be put into
perspective as they have formed the
“Dutch Disease” that Nigeria has
been attacked with over years:


The revenue from oil must be
used for the development of the
economy-infrastructure
maintenance etc.



There must be a creation of
sovereign wealth fund with
adequate legal backing to save
for the raining day.



There must be adequate fiscal
discipline and wise spending on
“necessary projects” and not
“prestige projects”. In this wise,
the National wage structure must
be tailored towards the economic
absorptive capacity.



The macro-economic policy must
be market driven in such a way
that the economic environment
would be conducive to private
investment and must
continuously promote marketoriented sustainable
development. Ghana must do
everything right in terms of
macro-economic policy to avoid
economic overheating and
exchange rate appreciation.









Ghana has an advantage of
population which is small
compared with Nigeria's
population. She is more united,
peaceful and ethnicity is underplayed

Ghana political and bureaucratic
elites have adopted/acquired a
“development orientation” and as
it is, she is a “developmental
state”. This is because she has a
thriving democracy, peace and
security and availability of basic
infrastructure particularly
electricity
Ghana's consensual democracy
has shown a very high level of
transparency in public revenue
acquisition and disposable while
corruption remained below the
level common in most developing
economies
Ghana's educational standard
has been rated high and so there
are crop of experienced
bureaucrats and expertise at that
level too. Most of their educated
people work in the civil service
and they work in close
collaboration with their political
leaders to avoid corruption.



Ghana has a growing economy
and squeaky-clean image, so
she is investors delight and a
success story.



However, oil has a way of
smearing reputation and the
petro-dollars that come from it
increases the temptation to be
corrupt, and often, the intense
scramble for a slice of the wealth
could sometimes stir conflict

In summary, Ghana must avoid the
pitfall of the Nigerian oil sector where
oil has harmed economies rather than
prosper the economies. Ghana must
not do away with his non-tradable

goods especially Gold even though it
has added little to her economies.
The environmental disaster observed
in Nigeria must not happen in Ghana
even though there is the history of the
environmental problem in the Gold
mining areas. Ghana must use the oil
revenue to diversify her economies.
5.0

S U M M A R Y
CONCLUSION

A N D

This has presented the status of
Nigeria as it relates to the oil industry
and the current status of the sector as
it relates to economic growth and
development. The paper was able to
establish that the literature considers
the oil shock and “Dutch Disease” as
issues that countries producing oil
must address to avoid the
management of the oil becoming a
“curse”. Countries with experiences
of natural resources being a
“blessing” was cited-Botswana,
Chile, Indonesia and Malaysia. In part
3, the paper dwelt on the details of the
Nigeria's oil and gas management.
This part brings out the pitfalls in
terms of the restructuring that
occurred during the civil war, the
ownership structure, the exploration
and production regime, the macroeconomic challenges and fiscal
indiscipline of the government. The
environmental and social issues were
discussed by highlighting the
environmental degradation, the
socio-economic deprivation and the
emergence of Emancipation for the
Niger Delta (MEND) militant group.
Part 4 dealt with the lessons for
Ghana and emphasized the need to
use the revenue for infrastructural
development and to save for the
raining day- in short fiscal discipline.
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